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An Overview of Dysfunctional Responses
Pascal Courty
Gerald Marschke
Explicit performance measurement systems may elicit unintended 
and dysfunctional responses, also known as gaming responses. Under-
standing when such responses take place, their extent and their nature, 
is essential for improving the design of measurement systems and the 
overall effectiveness of performance incentives. This concern is refl ected 
in the recent growth in empirical studies focusing on unintended behav-
ioral responses to explicit incentives. We review this literature and try 
to provide a unifying framework to put into perspective the various 
classes of dysfunctional responses that have been identifi ed in practice. 
We use this framework to discuss implications for the design of perfor-
mance measurement systems.
The performance measure is the rule used to collect and aggregate 
the data generated by the agent’s actions. The performance outcome 
is the value generated when that rule is applied to specifi c data. The 
next section proposes a formal classifi cation of dysfunctional responses 
based on the terminology of the multitasking literature. Dysfunctional 
responses occur when the performance measure does not communicate 
correctly the marginal impact of decision making on the true objec-
tive of the organization. We distinguish three kinds of dysfunctional 
responses: 1) accounting manipulations, which are responses that boost 
the performance outcome but have no other impact on the organization; 
2) gaming responses, which boost the performance outcome and have 
a negative impact on the organization; and 3) marginal misallocations, 
which have a positive impact on the organization but are suboptimal in 
the sense that alternative allocations would have a higher impact.  
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This classifi cation is useful because it can help guide the organi-
zation’s response to different dysfunctional behaviors. In the case of 
accounting manipulation, for example, the organization only has to 
invert the performance infl ation relation and appropriately discount the 
rewards to performance achievement. If this cannot be done satisfacto-
rily, however, accounting manipulations will have an indirect negative 
impact on the organization because the information contained in per-
formance outcomes may be misinterpreted. Gaming responses should 
unambiguously be eliminated as they have both a direct negative impact 
on the organization (misallocation of resources) and an indirect one 
(misinterpretation of outcomes). Marginal misallocations often origi-
nate from the fact that the performance measure is too coarse and does 
not capture some dimensions of value added. The typical remedy is to 
complement the performance measure with fi ner measures or with alter-
native evaluation methods (i.e., subjective performance evaluation).1 
After that we summarize the empirical literature on dysfunctional 
responses to performance measurement systems in public and pri-
vate sector organizations, with an emphasis on the former. We then 
review the evidence on dysfunctional responses in the JTPA organiza-
tion. Our point of departure is the earlier discussion of the weaknesses 
of the JTPA incentive system presented in Chapter 4. We exploit the 
analytical framework introduced there to understand the sources and 
consequences of dysfunctional responses. We conclude that section 
with some thoughts on the implications of the JTPA experience for WIA 
and its new performance incentive system.
The chapter ends with an assessment of the extent to which dys-
functional responses may impede the performance of measurement 
systems and draws lessons for policymakers. An important lesson of 
this review is that much progress has been made in identifying dys-
functional responses. A growing literature has produced studies that go 
beyond anecdotal reports and impressionistic evidence and try to iden-
tify dysfunctional behavior and measure performance infl ation. Still, we 
fi nd that this literature typically focuses on a narrow set of responses. In 
addition, the evidence reviewed rarely addresses the fundamental effi -
ciency question of measuring the welfare impact of the dysfunctional 
responses identifi ed. These conclusions suggest that much work is still 
necessary to further our understanding of dysfunctional behavior. 
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Before proceeding, we should acknowledge that others have dis-
cussed the existence of problems with performance measurement in 
both private and public organizations. See in particular Prendergast 
(1999), Propper and Wilson (2003), and Smith (1995). Other chapters 
in this book also discuss problems with performance measurement 
in JTPA and WIA. The main contribution of this chapter is to focus 
exclusively on the issue of dysfunctional responses, leaving aside more 
general problems associated with performance measurement, and to try 
to provide a comprehensive overview of such responses. To achieve 
this goal, we provide a theoretical framework to develop a formal 
classifi cation of dysfunctional responses. This classifi cation is useful 
to understand the practical challenges of identifying dysfunctional 
responses, to evaluate the negative impact of such responses, and to 
formulate appropriate remedies. We hope that this formal framework 
will be helpful in understanding the diffi culties organizations face to 
correctly measure and reward productivity, and ultimately that it will 
support the design of more effective models of performance measure-
ment and incentive systems. 
DEFINITIONS OF DYSFUNCTIONAL RESPONSES
A central assumption of the incentive literature is that performance 
measurement infl uences behavior, and most importantly, that it may be 
sometimes diffi cult to anticipate how it does so. Performance measures 
encourage the right kind of behavioral responses only if they suc-
cessfully communicate the organization’s true objectives. In an early 
discussion of the subject, Blau (1955) warns that if performance mea-
sures are not perfectly aligned with the organization’s objective, they 
may generate, in addition to intended responses, what could be called 
unintended or dysfunctional responses. 
A dysfunctional response is an action that increases the perfor-
mance measure but is unsupported by the designer because it does 
not effi ciently further the true objective of the organization (see, for 
example, Kerr [1975] and Jensen and Meckling [1992]). The multi-
tasking framework captures the notion that the investment allocation 
that maximizes performance outcomes does not necessarily correspond 
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to the allocation that maximizes value added (Baker 1992; Holmstrom 
and Milgrom 1991).2 
Although all dysfunctional responses share the general property 
that they were not intended by the incentive designer, there are types 
of dysfunctional responses that correspond to different ways in which 
the measurement technology may be imperfect. To provide a more pre-
cise classifi cation of dysfunctional responses, we borrow the language 
of the multitasking literature. The starting point of this literature is to 
assume that the agent invests in tasks. One could think of a task as a 
project. In the context of JTPA, for example, a task could be a single 
enrollee or a group of enrollees. The agent has to allocate resources 
across tasks and the issue is how the performance measure guides, or 
misguides, the agent’s resource allocation. Each task is characterized by 
its type . The agent privately observes the task’s type  and invests in 
effort, e. The performance outcome for task  is
M(e,g) = me.
We assume without loss of generality that m≥ 0. Our specifi cation 
ignores additive performance measurement noise.3 This assumption is 
not restrictive for the analysis, which focuses on defi ning dysfunctional 
responses.4 The principal’s objective or social value added on task is 
V(e) = ve.
Finally, we assume that investment in effort is costly:
C(e,g) = (½)ce2,
where c≥ 0. The performance outcome is 
MM(e).
The fundamental assumption of the multitasking literature is that 
the principal can observe only M. The performance measure, how-
ever, is an imperfect measure of the agent’s effectiveness because it 
aggregates the outcome of multiple tasks. As a result, the performance 
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measure may not be aligned with the true objective of the principal. 
Stated formally, this will be the case when the marginal return of effort 
on the measure is not the same as the marginal return of effort on the 
principal’s objective, m≠ v. 
Several comments are in order. First, this setup focuses exclusively 
on problems that are associated with the inadequacy of the measure 
to convey the true objective. It omits problems relating to the princi-
pal’s ability to select the right measure and implement it properly and 
to the agent’s willingness or capacity to respond to performance mea-
surement. Although we briefl y discuss the limitations imposed by these 
assumptions next, see Smith (1995) and Kravchuk and Schack (1996) 
for a more complete discussion of the problems that emerge when these 
assumptions do not hold. Some of these additional concerns regarding 
the implementation of performance measurement are also discussed in 
Chapters 3 and 4. 
Second, the multitasking framework assumes that the principal’s 
objective, V(e), is well defi ned. In practice, performance measurement 
sometimes fails because the principal’s objective is poorly defi ned or 
because the principal must strike a compromise between potentially 
confl icting goals. Our analysis does not address these problems. Con-
sider next our assumption that the agent chooses the resource allocation 
that achieves the highest outcome on the performance measures. This 
assumption rules out the possibility that the agent has his/her own 
preferences over resource allocation that confl ict with performance 
measurement. It also rules out the possibility that the agent is actu-
ally an organizational unit composed of multiple decision makers with 
confl icting objectives, as is frequently the case in the real world. In 
addition, we assume that the agent understands the technology of pro-
duction of the performance measure, M(e). Finally, our model abstracts 
from issues related to the dynamics of performance measurement. Here 
we consider a static model, ignoring the possibility that the principal 
may change the performance measure and the potential dysfunctional 
responses associated with such a possibility (Courty and Marschke 
2003a). 
Keeping these qualifi cations in mind, our setup suggests a formal 
defi nition of dysfunctional responses. A dysfunctional response is an 
investment choice that is different from the investment choice that max-
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imizes the organizational goal. Formally, an agent who maximizes the 
performance outcome invests 
e= m/c
in task  while the investment that maximizes the organizational objec-
tive is
       
*e= v/c. 
               
*A dysfunctional response occurs when e≠ e. We distinguish three 
types of dysfunctional responses:
1) Marginal misallocation: actions that enter the principal’s objec-
tive but are distorted in the performance measure. Formally,
m≠ v> 0 and c> 0. To illustrate, consider the case of perfor-
mance measurement in schools (Jacob 2005; Hannaway 1992). 
In recent years some policy analysts and public offi cials have 
advocated setting up performance measures for local school 
districts, possibly backed by educational subsidies as incentives 
(e.g., No Child Left Behind Act of 2002). Such performance 
measures are based on scores from standardized tests of reading, 
writing, and arithmetic. These tests do not measure the results 
of teaching citizenship, confl ict resolution, and interpersonal 
skills—skills that are an important aim of primary schools. 
Because the tests do not measure citizenship, for example, the 
theory predicts that teachers will invest less, or possibly neglect 
altogether, this skill. Instituting performance measurement can 
produce distortions by causing agents to spend little time on 
activities that are productive but not fully taken into account in 
the performance measure.
2) Accounting manipulation: actions that increase the perfor-
mance measure but do not enter the principal’s objective and 
do not enter the cost function. Formally, m> 0 and v= c= 
0. Accounting manipulations are activities that boost the per-
formance measure and do not waste resources. Such responses 
are informally known as “cooking the books” or “window 
dressing.” Accounting manipulation increases the agent’s 
chances of earning the rewards associated with higher perfor-
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mance outcomes. They may not create welfare loss since the 
organization could, in principle, neutralize this behavior by 
appropriately discounting the rewards to higher performance 
outcomes (Courty and Marschke 2004). If such adjustment in 
rewards is possible, this class of dysfunctional responses does 
not have direct ineffi ciency implications (since e= e on all 
tasks that actually enter the organization’s objective). Often, 
however, the principal may not be aware of such responses. 
When this is the case, the informative power of the perfor-
mance measure decreases and the principal may overreward 
those agents who invest more in accounting manipulation. 
Such dysfunctional manipulation would have indirect negative 
effi ciency impacts on the organization. 
3) Gaming: actions that increase the performance outcome neg-
atively enhance the principal’s objective and/or positively 
increase the cost function. Formally, m> 0, v≤ 0, and c≥ 0, 
with at least one of the last two inequalities strict. The distinc-
tion between accounting manipulation and gaming is that the 
latter imposes a cost to the organization because the agent ends 
up wasting resources to boost performance. For example, if 
the activities involved in “cooking the books” waste resources, 
then they fall within the category of gaming. Gaming implies 
not only some kind of accounting manipulation but also a costly 
misallocation of resources.
This classifi cation is useful because the organization’s optimal 
response depends on the type of dysfunctional behavior under con-
sideration. As mentioned earlier, the organization does not care 
about accounting manipulation if it can invert the performance infl a-
tion relation and appropriately discount the rewards to performance 
achievement. If this cannot be done satisfactorily, then accounting 
manipulations will have an indirect negative impact on the organiza-
tion. Gaming responses should unambiguously be eliminated as they 
have both a direct negative impact (e≠ e) and an indirect impact on 
the organization. Marginal misallocations often originate from the fact 
that the performance measure is too coarse and does not capture some 
dimensions of value added. The typical remedy is to complement the 
performance measure with additional measures or with alternative eval-
uation methods (i.e., subjective performance evaluation). 
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REVIEW OF EVIDENCE OF DYSFUNCTIONAL RESPONSES 
IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS 
Casual reports of dysfunctional responses to performance incen-
tives abound. Although sometimes insightful, such accounts only give 
a very impressionistic view of the actual extent and impact of such 
responses. It is typically not possible to establish on the basis of such 
reports the amount of performance infl ation that actually goes on, or to 
determine the existence of welfare loss. To draw relevant lessons for the 
design of performance measurement systems, one must develop system-
atic methods to identify and measure distortions. We start by discussing 
why it is diffi cult to systematically measure dysfunctional responses in 
practice. Next, we review different methods that have been successful 
at producing hard empirical evidence on dysfunctional responses.   
Challenges in Identifying Dysfunctional Responses
Several diffi culties arise when one tries to assess the extent of 
dysfunctional behavior. To start, demonstrating the existence of dys-
functional responses involves estimating relationships that are typically 
hidden from the researcher. One needs to identify actions that are not 
perfectly aligned with the principal’s objective. Using the notation of 
the model, one needs to show that m≠ v, and also possibly that c> 0, 
depending on the type of dysfunctional responses considered. But the 
researcher does not typically observe the marginal impacts of decision 
making on the production and cost functions. 
To illustrate, consider the case of marginal misallocation. 
Researchers who study agent responses to performance measures often 
fi nd evidence of actions that raise performance outcomes, but then 
fi nd it diffi cult to demonstrate that these actions are suboptimal (i.e., 
to show that these responses are not the ones that maximize the stated 
objective of the organization). The diffi culty lies in establishing the 
counterfactual of what the agent’s value added would have been absent 
the agent’s actions. Consider the cream skimming literature in job 
training programs that has studied enrollment responses to performance 
measurement in the JTPA organization (Chapters 6 and 9). Critics of 
JTPA’s performance incentive system feared that the measures used, 
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which focus on labor market success (e.g., employment status) at the 
end of training, would encourage managers to enroll only those par-
ticipants likely to perform well on employment measures—the most 
“job ready”—irrespective of how much they might gain from the pro-
gram (that is, increase their human capital). Some studies have found 
evidence that program managers prefer the job ready, but this alone is 
not evidence of dysfunctional responses. To demonstrate dysfunctional 
response, one must show that the job-ready applicants are also those 
who do not benefi t the most from the program (see Chapters 5 and 8, and 
Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith [2002]). Using our notation, although it 
seems intuitive that m/c is high for the job ready, one needs to prove 
that v/c is low for this target population to establish the existence of 
marginal misallocation. 
The literature has circumvented this challenge by focusing on incen-
tive schemes where dysfunctional responses can be unambiguously 
identifi ed from the specifi cs of the contract. A substantial fraction of 
the literature focuses on accounting manipulation responses where the 
agent uses its discretion over the timing and reporting of performance 
outcomes to meet performance thresholds (Asch 1990; Courty and 
Marschke 2004; Healy 1985; Jacob and Levitt 2003; Oettinger 2002; 
and Oyer 1998). The advantage of focusing on such timing and mis-
reporting strategies is that the observed responses can only be consistent 
with the specifi cs of the contract. Using the notation introduced earlier, 
these actions are unambiguously dysfunctional since m> 0 while v= 0. 
The main shortcomings of this approach, however, are that it can be 
applied only to a narrow set of dysfunctional responses and requires 
detailed information on the contracts and behavior that is often hidden 
from the researcher. Another shortcoming of this approach is that it will 
work only to identify accounting manipulations, to the extent that c= 0, 
and such responses are likely to have lower direct effi ciency impact 
than the other two types of dysfunctional responses. 
A fi nal approach to identify dysfunctional responses focuses on 
changes in performance outcomes that follow the introduction of a new 
performance measure. We discuss this approach in more detail in the 
next section.
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Evidence of Dysfunctional Responses
Propper and Wilson (2003) present some evidence of dysfunctional 
responses in their review of the empirical literature on the use and use-
fulness of performance measures in the public sector. In this section, 
we review some of this evidence, as well as new evidence, using the 
classifi cation presented above. 
Health sector
Dranove et al. (2003) study whether the introduction of report cards 
changes how health care providers select patients. Report cards pro-
vide information about the performance of hospitals. Skeptics argue 
that health report cards may encourage providers to game the system 
by cream skimming, that is, by avoiding sick and/or seeking healthy 
patients. Their evidence shows that report cards led to substantial selec-
tion by providers, with a decline in the illness severity of patients, a 
fi nding consistent with a cream skimming hypothesis. They conclude 
that the overall impact of the report card was to reduce welfare. This 
evidence is consistent with marginal misallocation, since perfor-
mance measurement generates a reallocation of resources that reduces 
effi ciency.
Goddard et al. (2000) present a general discussion of the diffi culties 
in implementing performance measurement. They consider the impact 
of the “Performance Framework,” an initiative by the UK National 
Health Service to increase the importance attached to formal perfor-
mance indicators in the health sector. They present qualitative interview 
evidence consistent with the hypothesis that performance measurement 
may generate a wide range of unintended responses. 
School and training program
Jacob and Levitt (2003) investigate teacher cheating, a behavioral 
response consistent with accounting manipulation. Some school dis-
tricts allocate school budgets on the basis of schools’ performance. A 
number of highly publicized incidents of teacher cheating have fueled 
the suspicion that teachers have responded by “teaching the test” and 
manipulating students’ grade-to-grade promotions to boost scores. 
However, most of this evidence is anecdotal. Jacob and Levitt propose 
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an innovative way to measure the extent of teacher cheating that com-
bines measures on unexpected test score fl uctuations and suspicious 
patterns of answers for students. They show that the joint distribution 
of these two variables should demonstrate systematic patterns if some 
teachers cheat and others do not. 
Jacob (2005) presents some evidence of marginal misallocation. 
He examines the impact of an accountability policy implemented in 
the Chicago Public Schools in 1996–1997. He fi nds that math and 
reading achievement increased sharply following the introduction of 
the accountability policy. He also fi nds that teachers responded strate-
gically to the incentives along a variety of dimensions—by increasing 
special education placements, preemptively retaining students, and sub-
stituting away from low-stakes subjects like science and social studies. 
Oettinger (2002) presents a study of academic performance evalu-
ations and shows that undergraduate students respond to nonlinear 
incentives. Due to the threshold effects implied by a discrete grade 
system, students tend to cluster slightly above grade boundaries. Using 
our terminology, this evidence is consistent with marginal misallo-
cation because students strategically change effort decisions to meet 
performance thresholds, a behavior that is unlikely to be effi cient. In 
fact, Oettinger’s evidence suggests that the performance incentive gen-
erates allocations of effort over the duration of the term that depend on 
the realized grade history. The effi cient allocation of effort, however, 
should not depend on grade history.   
Burgess et al. (2003) evaluate the impact of a pilot incentive scheme 
in Jobcentre Plus, a large UK public job training agency, and present 
some evidence of marginal misallocation. The incentive scheme they 
consider gives team bonuses for fi ve different targets that measure with 
varying degrees of precision the bureaucrats’ effectiveness at placing 
the unemployed into jobs. The authors hypothesize that in such a multi-
tasking environment, where different tasks are measured with different 
degrees of precision, workers may choose to exert effort on the tasks 
for which their actions are more easily verifi able. Consistent with this 
hypothesis, they fi nd an impact on job placement (quantity measure) 
but little impact on less precise measures (quality measures). 
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Private sector: managers and salespeople
Explicit performance measures are commonly used in private 
sector occupations such as fi rm executives (using both accounting and 
stock market based measures) and salespeople.5 Evidence of accounting 
manipulations from these occupations abounds. In an early contribution 
to the accounting manipulation literature, Healy (1985) documents that 
managers who are compensated for meeting annual income thresholds 
use their discretion over the timing of income reporting to smooth their 
compensation across accounting years. Similarly, Oyer (1998) uses dif-
ferences in the date of the end of the fi scal year for companies that are 
otherwise similar to show that there is more variability in fi rms’ sales 
at the end of the fi scal years—when salespersons’ bonuses are com-
puted—than in the middle. Oyer’s evidence should be interpreted as 
accounting manipulation, if salespeople only manipulate sales reports. 
Alternatively, if salespeople reallocate effort over the accounting year, 
then the evidence should be interpreted as marginal misallocation.6  
Gibbs et al. (2009) present some evidence that incentive designers 
are aware of marginal misallocations and actually structure measure-
ment systems to address such problems. They use data on incentive 
contracts for auto dealership managers to investigate whether incentive 
designers internalize multitasking concerns. They show that incentive 
designers select pools of incentive measures that complement each 
other, and set the relative weights on the different measures selected to 
address multitasking concerns. For example, the extent to which a mea-
sure distorts incentives (by discouraging cooperation or encouraging 
a short-term focus) reduces the weight it receives. In addition, fi rms 
use additional performance bonuses, based on subjective performance 
evaluation, to balance multitasking and manipulation incentives. 
EVIDENCE FROM JTPA 
This section reviews the evidence of dysfunctional responses in the 
JTPA organization. Here we draw from our own work but also refer to 
the work of Heckman and Smith presented in Chapter 6 and Heinrich 
in Chapter 8 of this monograph. The evidence presented in this section 
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builds upon the characteristics of the JTPA incentive system presented 
in Chapter 4 (see also Courty and Marschke [2003b] ). 
We present two kinds of evidence. The fi rst summarizes the econo-
metric evidence of behavioral responses to JTPA’s attempts to evaluate 
organizational performance, as well as estimates of the costs that are 
incurred when performance measures lead to dysfunctional behavior. 
This evidence establishes a clear link between the specifi cs of the incen-
tive policies faced by bureaucrats and their behavior. The second kind 
of evidence is based on survey data of self-reported behavior. This evi-
dence reviews a wider set of hypotheses regarding the implications of 
the incentive system but because the evidence is based on self-reported 
behavior, the inference is more anecdotal in nature and sometimes sub-
ject to interpretation. 
Timing Strategies
Using data from the National JTPA Study, we document how in 
the fi rst decade of JTPA, agencies delayed terminating unemployed 
enrollees, even after their training concluded, to maximize the perfor-
mance outcomes (Courty and Marschke 1997, 2004). This strategic 
termination behavior can be of two types. The fi rst type takes advantage 
of the fact that training agencies do not need to report the employment 
status of the enrollees who have completed their training on the date 
training ends but have a 90-day window to do so. Because labor market 
outcomes vary over time naturally on their own, training agencies 
have an incentive to strategically choose the date they report enrollees’ 
employment outcomes. At the end of an enrollee’s training, training 
agencies face a decision: terminate the enrollee and report her labor 
market outcomes or postpone termination in hopes that the outcome 
improves. The optimal termination strategy leads the training agency 
to terminate enrollees who are employed within the 90-day period fol-
lowing training either on the last day of training or on the fi rst day 
of employment, whichever occurs fi rst, and all others on the 90th day 
following training end. Courty and Marschke (2004) report evidence 
consistent with this hypothesis. They fi nd that this strategic reporting 
increases the overall employment rate at termination, which was the 
most important performance measure at the time, by 11.3 percentage 
points, from 47.0 percent to 58.3 percent. Stated differently, training 
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agencies in their study would produce an employment rate outcome 20 
percent lower if they were required to graduate enrollees (and report 
their performance outcomes) on the date they actually fi nish training.
The second type of strategic termination behavior takes place at 
the end of the fi scal year. Consider a stylized two-program-year incen-
tive system where the training agency receives an award if the yearly 
labor market–based performance outcome exceeds a fi xed performance 
standard. The training agency does not know its fi nal aggregate per-
formance outcome until the end of the program year because the labor 
market outcomes depend on random factors, such as the state of the 
local economy, which are outside its control. Because of the graduation 
strategy described above, the training agency reaches the end of the 
year with an inventory of enrollees who have fi nished training within 
the previous 90 days but are unemployed. At the end of the fi rst pro-
gram year, the training agency chooses how many from this inventory 
to graduate in the present program year, with the remainder to be gradu-
ated in the following program year. Assume there are n such persons, 
of whom n1 will be graduated in the fi rst program year and n2 = n – n1 
in the next one. The training agency chooses n1 to maximize the present 
value of the sum of the two awards.
The optimal graduation strategy on the last day of the fi rst program 
year depends on the difference between the performance outcome and 
the standard as the last day arrives. Let N = Ne + Nu be the number of 
persons who were graduated during the year (excluding the year’s last 
day), where Ne and Nu and are the numbers of such persons graduated 
employed and unemployed, respectively. Let S  be the performance 
standard. Three cases can be distinguished (see Figure 7.1). In case 1, on 
the last day of the year, the cumulative performance outcome exceeds 
the standard by so much that the training agency can graduate all unem-
ployed enrollees. This corresponds to the HIGH region in Figure 7.1. 
In case 1, because Ne /(N+n)  S , n1 = n. In case 2, which corresponds 
to the MED region in Figure 7.1, the cumulative performance outcome 
exceeds the standard, but not by much. In case 2, because graduating 
all unemployed enrollees would push the outcome below the stan-
dard, it pays the training agency to graduate persons from its inventory 
only until the performance outcome equals the performance stan-
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This equation implies that n1 lies between zero and n, approaching 
zero when the training agency just meets the standard and n when the 
training agency outperforms the standard by n/N percentage points or 
more. In case 3, corresponding to the LOW region in Figure 7.1, the 
training agency fails to meet the standard at the end of the year (Ne /N   
S ). In this case, because it cannot win an award this year, the training 
agency “takes a bath,” graduating all n persons from its inventory to 
maximize the probability of an award next year.
Courty and Marschke (2004) fi nd evidence that training agencies 
pursued such a termination strategy. In particular, they found that JTPA 
training agencies delayed graduating idle, unemployed enrollees longer 
than idle, employed ones; graduated idle, unemployed enrollees sooner 
if they fi nished in the last three months of the program year than if they 
fi nished within the fi rst nine months of the program year; and graduated 
Figure 7.1  The Graduation Decision
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unemployed enrollees who fi nished training in the last three months 
of the program year sooner if the training agencies were doing either 
very well or poorly relative to the employment standard. These fi ndings 
are consistent with the two-period graduation model. Thus the evidence 
suggests that by timing performance measurement in this way, training 
agencies boosted their performance and their awards without providing 
higher-quality services or providing services more effi ciently. 
Courty and Marschke (2004) make the important distinction between 
responses that divert resources (e.g., agents’ time) from productive 
activities and responses that simply refl ect an accounting phenomenon. 
Using our terminology, the former would be labeled gaming and the 
latter accounting manipulations. Others have documented timing strate-
gies but have not shown any effi ciency impact. Courty and Marschke, 
however, provide evidence that the responses they identify, by con-
suming programmatic resources, have a negative impact on the true 
goal of the organization and thus conclude that these responses are more 
than a mere accounting phenomenon. They are evidence of gaming. 
For example, they fi nd that earnings impacts are lower in those training 
agencies that engage more in termination strategies, which is consis-
tent with the hypothesis that graduation timing is ineffi cient. In addition, 
they fi nd that year-end timing is ineffi cient on two counts. First, training 
agencies are more likely to suddenly truncate training in June, an input 
distortion that is a direct consequence of the strategic manipulation of 
yearly performance that takes place in the month of June. Second, they 
fi nd that earnings impacts are lower for those enrollees who receive 
training in June. They interpret this fi nding as evidence that training 
agencies substitute time and effort away from training toward the end of 
the program year.
Other Dysfunctional Responses
We review additional evidence also consistent with dysfunctional 
behavior. To start, we show that accounting manipulation behavior is 
not limited to the employment at termination performance measure by 
presenting evidence from other performance measures. Then we present 
evidence that the incentive system may also distort the enrollment deci-
sion and the training allocation decision. 
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Manipulating the wage and earning measures
The graduation decision was also infl uenced by the other class 
of JTPA performance measures: the performance measures based on 
wages and earnings. Courty and Marschke (2004) focus on the optimal 
termination strategy for employed enrollees. They show that training 
agencies may choose to terminate employed enrollees who have little 
chance of experiencing a wage increase, but wait on those employed 
enrollees who have a high likelihood of experiencing a wage increase. 
The training agency does not wait on all enrollees because by doing so it 
might lose credit for some employment. This risk is signifi cant because 
approximately one-quarter of the enrolled who were employed on their 
graduation date were not employed at the same job three months later. 
The refi ned strategy that takes the wage measure into account implies 
that some employed enrollees should be terminated later than is pre-
dicted under the simple strategy presented earlier. Focusing on the 
enrollees who were employed at the end of training and who experi-
enced a second employment spell under a new employer before the close 
of the 90-day window, Courty and Marschke show that those enrollees 
who experience a wage decrease are more likely to be terminated during 
the fi rst employment spell. They also show that those participants who 
are graduated after the start of their secondary employment spell should 
experience higher wage offers. They conclude that the covariation of 
graduation delay and the wages in secondary employment spells appear 
consistent with a graduation strategy that maximizes the wage and 
earnings performance outcomes. This behavior qualifi es as accounting 
manipulation or gaming depending on its effi ciency impact.
Manipulating the follow-up measures
The switch from termination-based follow-up measures may have 
provoked several kinds of responses by local decision makers. First, the 
follow-up measures may have encouraged training centers to emphasize 
intensive training services (as opposed to employment-focused services, 
such as job search) in the hopes of producing larger and longer-lasting 
impacts on earnings and employment. Second, the follow-up measures 
may have induced caseworkers to extend their contact with enrollees 
beyond their termination dates. Courty and Marschke (2007) present 
some evidence suggesting that the follow-up performance measures 
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captured how effective training centers were at offering postprogram 
“quick fi xes” (such as transportation allowances) to enable the enrollees 
to stay employed on the follow-up measurement date. These responses 
qualify as marginal misallocation because such quick fi xes, although 
potentially productive, divert resources away from other activities that 
would have increased long-term earning and employment. 
Manipulating the cost measure
In addition to employment and wage/earning measures, in the 
early years JTPA training centers faced a cost-based measure that 
judged the program’s managers by how much they spent to produce 
an employment at termination. The incentives inherent in the cost and 
employment rate at termination measures were very similar (Courty 
and Marschke 2007). Thus, in time, JTPA offi cials came to believe that 
the cost measure also was encouraging short-run, “quick fi x”–type job 
placement activities in lieu of longer-term activities with more training 
content. In 1990, when they replaced the termination-based measures 
with follow-up-based measures, they also phased out the cost measure 
because they believed “that the use of cost standards in the awarding of 
incentives [had] the unintended effect of constraining the provision of 
longer-term training programs” (italics ours) (Federal Register 1990). 
Such responses—if they indeed occurred—belong to the category of 
marginal misallocation.
Enrollment
Cream skimming—the use of the training center’s considerable 
discretion to select enrollees on the basis of their expected effect on 
performance outcomes—is the core concern of most empirical anal-
yses of JTPA’s incentive system. The system judged training centers 
on the basis of postprogram employment and earnings levels, whereas 
the objective of training was skill development. Such performance out-
comes induce training centers to choose persons with high levels of 
human capital at the expense of persons who would most benefi t from 
training. The nature and evidence of cream skimming is discussed at 
length in Chapters 6 and 9. 
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Training selection
Researchers have also investigated the effects of JTPA performance 
incentives on training centers’ training strategies. While training choice 
has received less attention than the cream skimming issue, its study is 
motivated by similar concerns—that short-term performance measures 
encourage training centers to emphasize “quick fi xes,” services that 
have no long-term impact on enrollee skills.
Marschke (2002) studies the effects of two performance measure 
reforms on the training strategies of JTPA training centers. In the early 
1990s, the USDOL moved away from termination-based measures 
toward performance measured three months after termination. The 
USDOL also eliminated measures that rewarded training agencies 
that kept low the average cost of training an enrollee. Both reforms 
occurred in response to a growing perception that the training centers 
were relying heavily on job-placement-oriented services at the expense 
of more intensive kinds of training. Many policymakers also felt that 
the typical JTPA training spell was too short to be effective (average 
enrollment in the fi rst decade of JTPA lasted only about fi ve months). 
Marschke (2002) fi nds that these performance reforms produced 
mixed results. The switch to performance measurement three months 
after training ends appeared to encourage agencies to offer the kinds 
of intensive training that raise the long-term earnings abilities of JTPA 
enrollees, but the impacts from this reform were offset by the elimination 
of the cost measure. Apparently the cost measure had been discouraging 
training agencies from offering classroom vocational training because it 
was the longest and most expensive of the major kinds of training. After 
the cost measure was removed, training agencies offered more class-
room vocational training, but earnings impacts fell because classroom 
vocational training produced the smallest earnings impacts of the main 
kinds of training offered.7  
In the context of the multitasking model, rewarding the employment 
rate at termination measure, for example, was leading the center to pre-
scribe training activities that increased the training center’s employment 
rate but reduced the earnings ability of JTPA enrollees. The employment 
rate at termination measure and earnings impacts are misaligned. The 
cost measure, on the other hand, was leading training centers to favor 
training types that increased both earnings impacts and the training cen-
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ter’s award. Thus, the cost measure, insofar as it discouraged the use of 
vocational training, a relatively low-gain and high-cost activity, appears 
to have been aligned. To conclude, this discussion presents some evi-
dence consistent with the hypothesis that the choice of performance 
measure infl uences the agent’s choice of resource allocation, and that 
different performance measures are imperfect in different ways in the 
sense that each produces different patterns of marginal misallocation. 
General Test of Dysfunctional Responses
Courty and Marschke (2008) propose a different approach to iden-
tify dysfunctional responses. They look at how the correlation between 
the objective of the organization and the performance measure changes 
after a measure is introduced. The multitasking model predicts that this 
correlation should decrease after a measure is introduced if the agent 
engages in any kind of dysfunctional response. Courty and Marschke 
conclude that one can identify dysfunctional responses by estimating 
the change in correlation between a performance measure and the true 
goal of the organization before and after the measure has been activated. 
Using data from the JTPA incentive system, they test the hypothesis 
for the introduction of the follow-up measures, which corresponds to 
one of the most important changes in the history of JTPA’s incentive 
system. They fi nd some evidence consistent with the hypothesis and 
draw implications for the choice of performance measures.
WIA
WIA’s performance incentive system is still relatively new and 
therefore little studied. Nonetheless, the record on JTPA may allow us 
to draw some conclusions about the performance of WIA’s system. As 
Chapters 2 and 5 show, there are many similarities and some differences 
between performance incentives under JTPA and performance incen-
tives under WIA. As in JTPA, most of the performance measures in 
WIA are based on enrollees’ labor market outcomes. All labor market 
outcomes are measured after training ceases (as opposed to on the 
date of termination), as in latter-day JTPA. Moreover, WIA focuses on 
outcomes six months after job placement. In JTPA, performance out-
comes were far more short term. This may be an improvement over 
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JTPA in two ways. First, because labor market outcomes are measured 
six months after an enrollee leaves the program, outcomes are harder 
to manipulate in WIA by the strategic timing of graduation. Second, 
measuring outcomes six months after graduation reduces the return 
to “quick fi x”–type training strategies. As the JTPA evidence seems 
to show, longer-term measures lead to greater earnings gains from 
training. WIA also reinstates cost measures, which the evidence seems 
to show also improve earnings gains. 
Interestingly, in its early years WIA includes among the JTPA-style 
performance measures a before-after measure of enrollees’ earnings. 
Conceptually, the difference between an enrollee’s earnings before 
enrollment and after termination is more similar to an earnings or 
employment gain—and thus more similar to the objective of job training 
under JTPA and WIA—than is a posttraining labor outcome. While it is 
more similar to a job training impact, a before-after earnings measure 
also suffers from potential problems. For the average enrollee, earnings 
dip just before entering job training, suggesting that her earnings would 
eventually rise even if the job training program had no value. This 
phenomenon, the so-called Ashenfelter dip, means that before-after 
earnings differences are distorted measures of the true impact of job 
training (see Heckman and Smith [1999] for a discussion of this point.) 
Thus, whether before-after measures lead to less cream skimming is a 
question that must be answered with empirical studies.
CONCLUSIONS
This chapter offers a comprehensive overview of dysfunctional 
responses covering theoretical concepts, empirical evidence from both 
the public and private organizations, and summarizing studies of dys-
functional responses that focus on the JTPA organization. We assess the 
extent to which dysfunctional responses may impede the performance 
of the measurement system, and we draw lessons for policymakers.
Taken together, the evidence suggests that performance measures 
elicit unanticipated responses because line workers and their managers 
gain a superior understanding of how to infl uence these measures. Man-
agers and workers acquire through their day-to-day operation of their 
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programs an expert’s knowledge of the levers available to manipulate 
performance outcomes. Because the designers of the performance 
measures are remote from the everyday operations of the agencies 
they oversee, they lack this knowledge. This information asymmetry 
means that the designers of performance measures cannot anticipate 
all behavioral responses ex ante. An implication is that dysfunctional 
responses can present substantial challenges to the design of perfor-
mance measurement systems. At least three lessons can be drawn from 
the evidence.
1) Designers of performance measures should consider how local 
decision makers respond to the performance measures and 
accept that they cannot anticipate all responses. Most perfor-
mance measures elicit unanticipated responses because agents 
gradually gain a superior understanding of how to infl uence 
them. Designers should encourage some of these unanticipated 
responses and discourage others. 
2) Designers should respond differently to different types of dys-
functional behavior. In the case of accounting manipulation, for 
example, the organization only has to appropriately discount 
the rewards to performance achievement. Gaming responses 
should unambiguously be eliminated as they have both a 
direct negative impact on the organization (misallocation of 
resources) and an indirect one (misinterpretation of outcomes). 
Marginal misallocations often originate from the fact that the 
performance measure is too coarse and does not capture some 
dimensions of value added. The typical remedy is to comple-
ment the performance measure with fi ner measures. 
3) The evidence reinforces the conjecture that explicit perfor-
mance measures impose costs—monitoring and improvement 
consume resources (Prendergast 1999). Until performance 
measure designers discover them, the dysfunctional responses 
that imperfectly conceived performance measures engender 
can undermine the organization’s mission. These costs make 
the use of performance measurement systems uneconomical for 
many public sector organizations because they raise more man-
agement problems than they solve. This may explain why such 
organizations rarely implement explicit performance measures.
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In a separate line of research, we characterize a process by which 
the designers of performance measures learn about and respond to local 
decision maker responses (Courty and Marschke [2003a]; see also 
Heinrich and Marschke [2010]). This feedback loop suggests that per-
formance measurement systems must be continuously monitored and 
improved. We conclude that implementation is not a static, one-time 
challenge but a dynamic one. 
An important lesson of this review is that much progress has been 
made in identifying dysfunctional responses. A growing literature has 
produced studies that go beyond casual reports and anecdotal evidence 
and try to measure performance infl ation and assess the impact of these 
responses on the organization. Still, we fi nd that this literature typically 
focuses on a narrow set of responses. In addition, the evidence reviewed 
rarely compellingly addresses the fundamental effi ciency question of 
measuring the welfare impact of the dysfunctional responses identifi ed. 
This suggests that there is still much work to be done to further our 
understanding of dysfunctional behavior. 
Notes
We would like to thank James Heckman and Carolyn Heinrich. 
1. Subjective performance evaluation is based on judgment and is more qualitative 
and fl exible than explicit performance incentives. Unlike explicit performance mea-
sures, subjective performance measures cannot be verifi ed by outside parties and 
therefore organizations cannot contract upon them. 
2. The theoretical literature on incentive provision is reviewed in Gibbons (1997) and 
Prendergast (1999). Marschke (2001), Courty and Marschke (2003a), and Propper and 
Wilson (2003) also review this literature and draw implications specifi c to govern-
ment organizations. Dixit (2002) and Burgess and Ratto (2003) review the broader 
literature on organizational design and focus on issues that are specifi c to the public 
sector. Interestingly, this framework was introduced to explain why high-powered 
explicit incentives, whose canonical illustration is a piece rate system, appeared far 
less frequently in practice than is predicted by standard principal-agent models. The 
point of the theoretical literature on multitasking was to extend the principal-agent 
model to accommodate the possibility that high-powered explicit incentives may 
not be optimal when the principal cannot perfectly measure the objective she wants 
the agent to pursue.
3. Our specifi cation is very similar to the specifi cation in Baker (2002), who assumes 
that V = f.a +  and P = g.a + , where f and g are vectors of marginal products 
chapter7.indd   225 4/27/2011   9:50:58 AM
226   Courty and Marschke
of actions, a, in the principal’s objective and performance outcome equations. We 
ignore the error terms  and  as they do not infl uence the agent’s action choice (see 
the following note).   
4. In the standard principal-agent model, measurement noise plays a role in the de-
termination of the optimal contract, but it does not directly infl uence the agent’s 
investment decisions.
5. When output can be measured, manual work is another occupation where explicit 
performance measurement is common. In an unusual study, Lazear (2000), for ex-
ample, discusses how an installer of automobile glass minimized the impact of po-
tential dysfunctional responses to the introduction of piece rate rewards.
6. Asch (1990) also presents some evidence of reporting timing. She shows that navy 
recruiters who receive awards for meeting year-end recruitment quotas respond by 
reallocating their work efforts over the year.
7. This fi nding is consistent with the results of the National JTPA Study, which found 
that compared with job search assistance and on-the-job training, vocational class-
room training produced the weakest earnings and employment gains (see Orr et al. 
1994). One interpretation of Marschke’s fi nding is that the deactivation of the cost 
measure in the early 1990s was misguided. The fi nding does not rule out, however, 
that at the same time it discouraged the use of vocational classroom training, the 
cost measure encouraged training centers to cut corners in the delivery of services, 
or to dilute or prematurely shorten training activities for enrollees. 
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